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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Hercules Incorporated,
Plaintiff,

;f"

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et. al.
Defendants and
Appellees.

]1

Appellate Court No. 9 00542

1

Priority No. 16

..]

WEST VALLEY CITY CORPORATION,
a Utah Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

]
]
]
]

vs.

']i.

SALT LAKE COUNTY, et. al.
Defendants and
Appellees.

Pursuant

to

Rule

REPLY BRIEF

Appellate Court No. 90054 2

]i

Priority No. 16

]
]

24(c)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, the Appellant, West Valley City, hereafter the "City"
hereby responds to new matters set forth in the County's brief.
Most new matters raised may accurately be termed "red herrings" in
that they amount to little more than distractions from the primary
issue before the Court in this case. The primary issue of law this
Court has been asked to consider is whether the wording of §11-12-3
Utah Code Ann. (hereafter §11-12-3) artificially extends the time
at which the taxing boundaries change in the event of a municipal
boundary change.
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I.
A.

"Red Herrings" Raised by the County.

Constitutional Challenge.

The City does not challenge the constitutionality of §11-12-3
nor is there a challenge to the Legislature's power to legislate
taxation. The City simply asserts that the County's interpretation
of that section is in error.

The Legislature has not, through §11-

12-3, delayed the change in taxing boundaries of annexed territory
previously within Municipal-Type Service District No. 1 to allow
the District to retain taxes assessed and levied on property no
longer within its boundaries.

Without an express statutory grant

of authority, the general rule is that the taxes assessed

but

uncollected as of the date of levy belong to the annexing

or

incorporating entity.

6 2 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §7 9. West

Valley City annexed the new territory far in advance of the date of
assessment and levy for the tax year 1988 and should therefore have
received the taxes for the provision of municipal services to the
annexed territory.
B.

Administrative Inconvenience.

The County attempts to impress this Court with the

great

administrative inconvenience of giving the tax dollars collected
i

for municipal services to the annexing or incorporating entity that
must now provide the services.

The City strongly disagrees with

the County's unsubstantiated claims of having to adjust budgets,
i

valuations and rates for numerous taxing entities.

There are only

the three entities affected by the change, the County through its
District and the City.

The County is statutorily able to open its
2
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budget for the purpose of reevaluation and adjustment during the
budget year.

§17-36-32(3), Utah Code Ann.

inconvenience
oppressive

is

on

a determining

the

City's

If administrative

factor, the

side,

in

that

facts
under

are
the

equally
County's

interpretation of §11-12-3, the incorporating or annexing entity
has to deliver services to a new territory without property taxes
to pay for them.

The extent of administrative inconvenience to

both the City and County is factually disputed and should not be a
determining factor in determining the question of law before this
Court.
C.

Administrative Interpretation.

The

County

further

asserts

that

an

administrative

interpretation given to §11-12-3 over the years is evidence that
they

ought

to

be

permitted

to

retain

the

taxes

from

newly

incorporated or annexed territory though they no longer provide
those services which are now required of the acquiring entity.

The

County misapplies the cases cited in their brief in support of this
proposition.

Administrative practices may be a consideration when

ambiguity exists in the statute.
provisions

of

§11-12-3

are

In the present case the statutory
express.

Only

the

County's

interpretation of that section may be termed "ambiguous" since it
is based on implications and conjecture and not the plain wording
of that section. Notwithstanding, the number of new incorporations
and annexations in this State have been few and the resulting
distribution of tax dollars cannot be said to have created an
administrative practice contrary to the express wording of §11-12-
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3.

If such an error in administrative interpretation has occurred,

the City now asks this Court to correct the error.
D.

The City's Control Over Boundary Changes.,

The County also erroneously asserts that the City has control
over boundary changes and receives tax dollars from other sources
and, therefore, little harmed by the County's retention of tax
dollars needed to service the new territory.

Once again, this is

not an issue relevant to obtaining an accurate interpretation of
§11-12-3.

Notwithstanding, the County is far from accurate.

The

creation and expansion of City boundaries is governed by State law.
The incorporation of a city is, by statutory mandate, complete on
July 1 of a given year.

Since notice, pursuant to §11-12-1, must

be filed after the boundary change is complete, under the County's
interpretation of §11-12-3, a newly incorporating city is never
able

to

receive

incorporated.

tax

dollars

for

the

year

in

which

it

is

Also, §10-2-415, Utah Code Ann., requires that a

developer developing within one half mile of the City's boundaries
apply for annexation. Under the County's interpretation of §11-123, the City would have to stall development off until December when
it could annex without loss of property tax dollars.

In these

cases

date

"development,"

annexation.

not

the

City,

determines

the

of

If the Legislature* intended the interpretation of §11-

12-3 that the County proposes, they failed to provide for these
significant contingencies.
The above issues, though informative, should not be permitted
to cloud the issues of law before this Court.

Does

§11-12-3
<

4
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prohibit ad valorem taxation by cities of property within their
physical boundaries for municipal services they must provide and
consequently, is the County entitled to retain those taxes for
services it does not provide?
II.

A.

THE COUNTY'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
11-12-3, UTAH CODE ANN. , VIOLATES RULES
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Statute Must Be Given Its Literal Meaning.

The County contends that §11-12-1 is a comprehensive
exclusive

process

by

which

political

subdivisions

may

and
be

incorporated, established or the boundaries thereof modified and
that these provisions provide for change of boundary for ad valorem
tax purposes at a later period of time than the actual physical
occurrence

of

the

boundary

change.

Such

an

assertion

and

interpretation is in direct contradiction of the basic principles
of statutory construction set forth by this Court in governing
taxation. Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission,
796 P.2d 1256 (1990).

In that case this Court established a rule

of statutory construction important to the current case:
A second rule of statutory construction
mandates that a statute be read according to
its literal wording unless it would be
unreasonably confusing or inoperable. It is
presumed that a statute is valid and that the
words and phrases used were chosen career-lly
and advisedly. Id. at page 1258.
The County erroneously reads part of §11-12-1 out of context
by combining those provisions with the provisions of §11-12-3 to
create new law.

The County takes the first sentence of §11-12-1

which states:

5
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No county service area, special purpose
district, city or town may be incorporated,
established, or the boundaries modified,
without notification of the change being filed
with the State Tax Commission within 10 days
after the conclusion of the proceedings in
connection with the change.
and combines it with the independent provision of §11-12-3 which
states:
Property annexed to any existing taxing entity
of property in any new taxing entity shall
carry any tax rate imposed by that taxing
entity, as required by Section 11-12-1, is
made to the Tax Commission not later than
December 31 of the previous year.
They now interpret these two sections as reading that no
boundary change for the purpose of taxation may occur until the tax
year

following

the

annexation

December of the previous year.

unless

notice

is

given

before

This Court has firmly determined

that a statute must be read according to its literal wording,
unless it would be unreasonably confusing or inoperable.

Section

11-12-1 specifically provides that a boundary is complete after
notifying

the

State

Tax

Commission within

10 days

after

conclusion of the proceedings in connection with the change.

the
West

Valley City lawfully completed this requirement on March 31 of the
tax year in question.

At that time, all legal requirements for a

boundary change were met, the annexation became final and the
boundaries were changed
taxation.

for all purposes including ad valorem

Section 10-2-415(4)(b)1 and §11-12-1, Utah Code Ann*

x

0n filing the maps or plats, the territory annexed is part of
the annexing municipality, and the inhabitants of the annexed
territory shall enjoy the privileges of the annexing municipality.
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The issue of boundary change being addressed, the Legislature
next made provision for determining which "tax rate" would apply to
the annexed area, but made no statement which would grant power to
the

County to tax the newly annexed area even though

physically within the City boundaries.

it was

Section 11-12-3 provides

that without the required notice, the new entity cannot apply its
own tax rate.

The literal wording of this section only addresses

the "tax rate" to be applied.

It does not address the matter of

who may levy the tax, either expressly or by implication.

This

determination is governed by the "general rule" that where the
property is located on the date of levy determines which entity
will receive the tax.
with

that

principle.

legislation

governing

Other provisions of the Code are in harmony
The

express provisions of the

Municipal-Type

Service

enabling

District

No. I2

expressly provide for the levying of a tax only on territory within
district boundaries. No special distinction is made between actual
physical

boundaries

and

boundaries

for

ad

valorem

taxation

purposes.
The Legislature makes no reference to §11-12-3 in the enabling
provisions governing Municipal Type Service District No. 1 to the
2

(1) Whenever a county furnishes the municipal-type services
and functions described in Section 17-34-2 of this chapter to areas
of the county outside the limits of incorporated cities or towns,
the entire cost of the services or functions so furnished shall be
defrayed from funds that the county has derived from either (a)
taxes which the county may lawfully levy or impose outside the
limits of incorporated towns or cities, or (b) service charges or
fees the county may impose upon the persons benefitted in any way
by the services or functions, or (c) a combination of these
sources.
7
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artificial extension of its boundaries for the purposes of ad
valorem taxation in the event of a boundary change.
fiction created by the County.

That is a

The plain wording of those sections

presently provide for the levy of taxes upon those areas within the
boundaries of the special district and make no reference to the
extension of boundaries for ad valorem taxing purposes.

When the

service district provides municipal services it may defray its cost
from funds derived from:
(a)

taxes which the county may lawfully levy or impose
outside the limits of incorporated towns or cities
§17-34-3, Utah Code Ann. (Underline added).

The principle rule of statutory construction identified above
operates on the presumption that "... a statute is valid and that
the words and phrases used were chosen carefully and advisedly. "
M a x at Page 1258.

At the date of levy,, the territory annexed was

entirely within the municipal boundaries of West Valley City.

The

Service District cannot levy a tax outside its boundaries.
B.
Mandatory Language Necessary to Sustain the
Interpretation of §11-12-3 is Missing.
A

County's

second important rule of statutory construction

in tax

matters was provided by this Court in Kennecott Copper Corporation
v.

Salt

Lake County,

575

P.2d

705

(Utah

1978).

The

County

incorrectly claims that the requirements of §11-12-3 were mandatory
conditions precedent to the City's ability to tax. The language of
§11-12-3

does

not meet

the

Court's

mandatory conditions on the City.

requirements

for

imposing

In Kennecott Copper/ this Court

made a determination of whether the provisions of two statutes that

8
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

use the words "must" and "shall" were directory or mandatory.

Utah

Code Annotated, §59-9-6.3 (1953) provided:
The board of county commissions of each county
must levy a tax on taxable property of the
county between the last Monday in the seventh
month and the second Monday in the eighth
month . . .
Utah Code Annotated, §17-36-31 provided that:
On or before the second Monday in August of
each year, the governing body shall levy a tax
on taxable real and personal property . . .
The Court held that those two statutes were directory and
permitted Salt Lake County to set a new levy after the statutory
date had passed-

In reaching that holding, the Courts reasoned:

Generally, those directions which are not of
the essence of the thing to be done, but which
are given with a view merely to the proper,
orderly and prompt conduct of business, and by
the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to
those whose rights are protected by the
statute,
are
not
commonly
considered
mandatory. Likewise, if the act is performed
but not in the time or in the precise manner
directed by the statute, the provision will
not be considered mandatory if the purpose of
this statute has been substantially complied
with and no substantial rights have been
jeopardized. Id. at page 706.
The Court also stated:
The general rule is that a statute prescribing
the time within which public officers are
required to perform an official act, is
directory only, unless it contains negative
words denying the exercise of the power after
the time specified of the nature of the act to
be performed, or the language used by the
legislature shows that the designation of time
was intended as a limitation . • • . Id. at
page 706. (Emphasis added).

9
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The

focus of

the Court

in making this determination

was

whether or not the purpose of this statute was to protect the
taxpayer:
On the other hand, where the purpose of the
statute is not to protect the taxpayer, but
merely to set up a guide for the tax
officials, a provision as to time when an act
is to be performed by a tax official or board
is
ordinarily
construed
to
be
merely
directory, especially where there are no
negative words in the statute that the act
shall not be done at any other time. Id. at
page 706.
Thus, notwithstanding the use of the words "must" and "shall",
the Court concluded that these two statutes were directory because:
The time provisions appear consistent with a
legislative purpose to establish a guide for
the orderly and prompt conduct of the public
business. Furthermore, there are no negative
prohibitions in the statutes as to time or
performance.
Finally, the purpose of the
statute is not to protect the taxpayer, viz.,
to give him notice or an opportunity for a
hearing. Id. at page 706 and 707.
Similarly, the provisions of §11-12-3 are directory because
the statute was not enacted

to protect taxpayers, nor is the

statute drafted in the negative, prohibiting the act of levying
taxes unless timely notification is made.

The logical purpose of

the above statute is to facilitate the prompt and orderly conduct
of public business by establishing a guide for the notification and
recording of the transfer of property from one taxing jurisdiction
to another. The language of §11-12-3 is not mandatory.

Therefore,

as long as a tax assessment and levy are made while property is
within an entity's territorial jurisdiction, the assessment and
levy is valid.
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The County has argued that the use of a County tax rate, if
proper

notice

is

not

given

under

§11-12-3, is

uniformity, truth-in-taxation and other problems.

fraught

with

While the City

believes these concerns are unfounded, the above rule provides a
consistent, alternative argument regarding interpretation of §1112-3.

Where the County proposes that §11-12-3 is a mandatory

prerequisite to taxation, the City, due to the above rule, would
assert that the language is directory only in that the City's
failure to comply with the provisions of §11-12-3 do not take away
its power to tax those properties found within its boundaries on
the date of levy.

Under the above rule, the City may impose its

own tax rate and levy a tax against properties found within its
boundaries upon the date of levy.

Since the date of annexation was

far in advance of the date of levy in the instant case, the City
may lawfully levy a tax at its own rate for the municipal services
it must provide to the new territory.
At the very least, the express language of §11-12-3 does not
extend the time for inclusion of the new territory within the
boundaries

of

the

City

and

authorize

the

County

to

tax

extraterritorially.

§11-12-3 provides a guide for the orderly and

prompt

public

conduct

of

business.

There

is

no

negative

prohibition as the time for performance and the purpose of the
statute is not to protect taxpayers.
The express provisions of §11-12-3 do not take away the City's
power to tax, nor does it authorize the County to tax outside the
physical boundaries of the service district.

Numerous provisions

11
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throughout the Utah Code and Utah case law specifically prohibit
taxation outside the physical boundaries of a taxing entity.

Those

same provisions and cases recognize the date of levy as the date at
which power to tax is determined.

As previously stated, §10-2-

415(4)(b) and §11-12-1 expressly provide that upon the filing of
all plats and maps with the County Recorder and upon notice to the
Tax Commission within 10 days after the date of annexation, the
annexation is final for all purposes and the annexed territory is
within

the

boundaries

of

the

municipality.

As

indicated

previously, the enabling provisions of the Special District Act,
under which Municipal-Type Service District No. 1 was created,
expressly provides only for tcixation for a levying of tax within
its boundaries.

(See footnote 2 ) . Article XIII, §10 of the Utah

Constitution3 also clearly recognizes the right of an entity to
levy taxes only upon property within its boundaries.

For almost

100 years, numerous cases in the State of Utah have sustained the
same principle. Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah
1974), Utah Parks Company v. Iron County, 380 P.2d 924 (Utah 1963),
Parry v. Bonneville Irrigation District, 263 P. 751 (Utah 1928),
Gillmor v. Dale, 75 P. 932, 934 (Utah 1907).

The County now

insists that the statutory provision, §11-12-3, creates a fiction
ignoring the physical change in boundaries and by changing the
boundaries for ad valorem tax purposes at a later date.
3

All corporations or persons in this State, or doing business
herein, shall be subject to taxation for State, County, School,
Municipal or other purposes, on the real and personal property
owned or used by them within the Territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax. (Underline added).
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is well established

that upon boundary

change, it is

competent for the Legislature to provide for the disposition of
municipal taxes uncollected as of the date of consolidation or
annexation.

In the absence of such a provision, taxes assessed on

the annexed territory, but not collected as of the date of the
annexation, belong to the annexing city.

62 C.J.S., Municipal

Corporations §79. The County has not challenged the application of
the

above

rule,

but

instead,

insists

that

§11-12-3

is

the

Legislature's mandate providing

for the disposition of the ad

valorem

the

taxes.

In

light

of

above

rule

of

statutory

construction, however, the language the County refers to in §11-123 for that proposition does not accomplish that.

There is no

express wording extending the time for boundary change for ad
valorem tax purposes and there is no negative, mandatory language
prohibiting the City from taxing if the December 31 deadline is not
met.
The rules of statutory construction prohibit the County from
interpreting that section in the above manner.

The City would

respectfully request that the Court find that the language of §1112-3 is directory only, and that the City's failure to comply with
that language does not prohibit the City's levying an ad valorem
tax upon property within its boundaries upon the date of levy.
III. THE COUNTY'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
11-12-3 CREATES A DOUBLE TAX.
If the County is correct, citizens of an annexing city must
pay for services provided to citizens in the newly annexed area as
well as to themselves.

This was precisely the case in Salt Lake
13
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City Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 550 P.2d 1291 (1976).

In

referring to the provisions of §17-34-1, the same Code sections
that

govern Municipal-Type

Service

District

No.

1, the

Court

stated:
This statute was passed to remedy what is
commonly known as "double taxation" which
results when municipal residents are required,
through county tax assessments, to finance
services provided exclusively to residents of
the unincorporated areas of the county. Id.
at page 1292.
In the present case, citizens in the newly annexed area must
pay

for

municipal

services

provided

unincorporated area of the County,

exclusively

to

the

At the same time, citizens of

the annexing entity must bear the entire burden for providing
municipal services to the new territory.

In addition, if, as is

often the practice, tax anticipation notes were issued for the
provision of municipal services to the newly annexed territory, to
defray the cost of municipal services by the newly incorporated
city or annexing

city, the

citizens

in the newly annexed

or

incorporated area would be required to pay a second time for the
provision of municipal services for the year in which they were
provided.

The County's interpretation of §11-12-3 works as a

double tax on both the citizsms of the annexing and/or newly
annexed areas.
IV.

TRUTH IN TAXATION REQUIREMENTS ARE
MET BY THE CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 11-12-3.

Truth-In-Taxation provisions of the Utah Code are not violated
by the City's interpretation of §11-12-3.

In the present case,

14
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under the City's interpretation of this section, the tax rate to
the new territory would be either the same as the County's or at
the lower City rate.

The Services provided would not change.

only change would be the entity levying the tax.

The

The property

owners must, under the States annexation law, be given notice of
the change in boundaries and therefore is aware to the change in
taxing entity.

If the tax rate will be greater than the rate of

the annexing entity's, the process for notification is proscribed
in the State Code.
requirements

of

Section 59-2 Part 9 Utah Code Ann.
Truth-in-Taxation

are

met

under

The notice
the

City's

interpretation of §11-12-3.
V.

THE CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1112-3
COMPLIES
WITH
UNIFORMITY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Uniformity of taxation provisions of the Utah Constitution are
not violated by the taxation of the newly annexed area by the City,
at either its own rate or at the County's rate.

If, pursuant to

the rules of construction arguments made in Argument II B above,
the City used its own tax rate, the County would not have any
uniformity argument since the new area would be taxed at the same
rate as all other properties in the City. The City, however, takes
issue with the County's understanding of uniformity. Article XIII,
§2(1) states:
All tangible property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under
this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform
and equal rate in proportion to its value, to
be ascertained as provided by law.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

As has been properly stated by the County in their brief, the
Legislature governs ad valorem taxation by "general law".
XI,

§35, Utah Constitution.

The uniformity provisions

Article
of the

State's Constitution specifically impose upon the Legislature the
responsibility of complying with the intent of this section when
dealing

with

taxation.

It

does

not,

however,

presume

specifically instruct the Legislature on how to do this.

to

It is

well established that the intent of uniformity provisions, such as
the one this State's Constitution, are meant to preclude double
taxation

and

unreasonable

and

unjust

discrimination.

16 McQuillans, Municipal Corporations, Taxation §44.19.
The Legislature, in dealing with the difficult problem of "tax
rate" in the event of a boundary change, enacted §11-12-3.

This

section reasonably provides that the newly annexed property will
not be taxed at its own tax rate unless the required notice is
given.

The obvious question is, which tax rate then applies?

If

the County's understanding of uniformity prevails, the City must
look at the provisions of §11-12-3 as being directory only and
apply its own tax rate notwithstanding that direction.

If the

City's understanding prevails, the County's rate will be applied.
In either case, the City is the entity levying the tax.

The County

may not levy a tax.
The City asserts that the Legislature, by enacting §11-12-3,
has eliminated the possibility of double taxation and does not
unjustly discriminate in taxing the newly annexed area at the same
rate as surrounding properties though the taxing boundaries change.
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It is well recognized

that government's

ability to deal with

taxation is not always going to result in precise equality.

The

intent of a uniformity clause is to prevent the arbitrary and
unreasonable acts of government in this regard and not to prohibit
the

reasonable

attempts

of

government

to

provide

for

such

contingencies as a change in boundary. The Legislature's treatment
of the tax rate to be applied upon annexation does not violate the
uniformity provision of the Constitution, but instead, comports
with the intent of that provision•
VI.
In

CONCLUSION

conclusion,

the

focus

interpretation of §11-12-3.

of

this

appeal

centers

on

an

The City's position is that this

section refers only to the tax rate that must be applied to newly
annexed territory and that the language is merely directory and not
mandatory.

The

legal

interpretation are sound.

arguments

in

favor

of

the

City's

Notwithstanding, the fairness of the

City's position must also be considered.

It is not fair to require

the City and its tax payers to provide municipal services to a
newly annexed area and at the same time, fail to provide funding
for it to do so.

Neither is it fair to bestow upon the County, a

windfall of tax dollars for municipal services they no
provide to the annexed area.

longer

The County has created a fiction by

their interpretation of §11-12-3 that does both of these things.
The City respectfully requests that this honorable Court determine
that the wording of §11-12-3 determines only which tax rate applies
and that the language of that section dealing with notice, is
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directory and not mandatory and does not artificially prevent a
boundary change for ad valorem tax purposes until the next tax
year.
DATED this 25th day of June, 199,

{
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